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Background 


Performance contracts 
Salmi and Hauptmann (2006): 
• performance contracts typically are not legally enforceable 
documents. Instead, they are more often non-binding 
regulatory agreements negotiated between governments 
or buffer bodies and tertiary education institutions which 
can take a number of forms. The agreements may be with 
entire systems of institutions or individual institutions. All 
or a portion of funding may be based on whether 
institutions meet the requirements in the contracts. The 
agreements can be prospectively funded or reviewed and 
acted upon retrospectively. In some instances, such 
contracts can be viewed as a punitive instrument rather 
than as incentives, as failure to meet goals may result in 
reduced funding. (p. 17). 
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Performance Agreements: A new trend? 
– Australia: Mission-based compacts (2011) 
– Germany: Ziel- und Leistungsvereinbahrungen (2006) 
– Hong Kong: Performance and Role-related Funding Scheme 
(2005)  
– Ireland: Structural system change (2012); Institutional 
Profiles 
– Denmark: 3rd gen. University Development Contracts (2007) 
– Finland: Performance contracts (2010) 
– Netherlands: Performance Contracts (2012) 
– Austria: Leistungsvereinbarungen (?) 
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Graph 3: Four funding systems 
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Trends in funding mechanisms 
In which governance paradigm do PAs fit? 
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Funding of HE: three ingredients 
1. stable, core institutional funding ensuring scientific 
autonomy and a broad coverage of disciplines; 
2. a competitive element, providing ex post rewards for 
good teaching and research performance and ex ante 
budgets based on agreed objectives; and 
3. an ‘innovation’-oriented component, to pre-finance 
new cutting-edge and/or explorative research 
developments and innovative degree programmes;  
– for example, the competitive ex ante funding of research in 
priority areas of strategic importance for economy and 
society (project funds) 
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Balancing missions:  
• ‘Mission-centred and 
market-smart’ (Massy, 2009) 
• Part church, part car dealer 
(Gordon Winston, 1997) 
• Objective: create ‘value’, 
subject to financial 
constraints 
• Value: new knowledge, 
prestige, entrepreneurial 
graduates & scientists, …  
Hybridity : challenges and tensions  
• How do different universities combine ‘mission’ and 
‘market’? (and prevent univ. from ‘falling apart’) 
– Different institutional logics 
– Dutch performance contract deals with both, simultaneously 
• Decentralisation (centre - departments): decentralising 
most expenditure decisions, devolving some revenue 
streams 
• Cross-subsidies 
Performance agreements 
Large variety 
Agreements between gov’t/ministry/state and HE institution  
– Replacing state-wide pacts (Hochschulpakte; framework 
agreements) between a state government and all higher 
education institutions 
– Agreements (Performance Agreement, Zielvereinbarungen) 
between a state government and a particular university 
– Competitive proposals against pre-defined objectives and 
outcomes in identified areas of national priority 
Or between:  
– university president and faculty (dean) 
– dean and professors 
– Professor and PhD student 
–  … 
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Performance Agreements: Why? 
• Desire to increase university performance (in T & R & …) 
– Promises on future performance => money in advance (multi-period) 
• Enhance transparency & accountability w.r.t. performance 
• Allow room for diversification of institutional missions 
– Acknowledge individual university’s context & character 
– Link to university’s strategic plan and initiative 
• Emphasising national strategic priorities 
– Future-/innovation-oriented (provide longer planning horizon) 
– Ensure increasing contribution of universities to societal needs  
– E.g. Create critical mass and specialisation / profiling 
 
 
• Increase public trust & partnership, through dialogue/ 
bilateral negotiation 
• Legitimization for funding 
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Performance Agreements: Contents 
• Contributions from two sides (state: budget; HEI: 
performance) to realising common goals 
• University specifies objectives and its contribution (in 
terms of performance) to national strategic goals 
– Quality/quantity of T & R 
– Link to University profile (priorities) 
• Milestones, performance measurement (verifiable 
indicators) 
• The contract (in the Dutch case) may cover the mission as 
well as the market activities of HEI 
 
• Performance-oriented (not stressing inputs, activities) 
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Performance Agreements: Design 
• Protocol, Guidelines/Format for documents, Duties 
• Multi-period horizon (allowing financial stability): 2-5 years 
• Timeline for process (from kick-off to signing/execution of contract 
and evaluation of PA) 
• Bottom-up proposal by HEI, based on state guidelines 
• Criteria (for judgement of proposal and final assessment) 
• Specification of financial mechanisms: rewards, sanctions for (non-) 
goal attainment 
• Reporting (incl. indicators): frequency and intensity 
 
 
• Transparency (about process, design, potential consequences of PA) 
• Public character of contract (published document) 17 
Performance agreements… 
• Require complex design questions, due to often 
qualitative character of objectives (unless one 
resorts to formulas) 
• Require time for dialogue (preferably mediated 
through independent commission) 
• Goals and their realisation difficult to measure 
and quantify through performance indicators 
 
 
• Substantial transaction costs and controlling 
mechanisms 
• List of suggested national/central goals may be overly 
long and prescriptive, with multiple goals (that may be 
conflicting) 
– HEI tempted to list all kinds of initiatives 
– No priorities set by HEI => mission overload 
• Policy-makers wish to see activities and inputs, but 
should stress outputs and performance 
• Environment may change after signing (ruling coalition, 
economic climate, technology & discipl. fields) 
– Creates inflexibility 
 
• HEI has to prioritise => strategic profile  
• Reflect on objectives (in-period) and discuss w experts 
Pitfalls of Performance Agreements 
•  
Reflections on Performance Agreements (PA) 
• Challenge: Balance PA with other funding components 
• PA can compensate simplicity and ex-post character of 
formula funding 
• PA to give state-HE dialogue a formal structure 
• Primarily an accountability instrument, to legitimize 
basic funding, to create/restore public trust in HE 
• May create extra accountability burden  
• Lack of adequate performance indicators addressed 
by referring to activity / input indicators (dangerous!) 
• Non-realisation of contract goals: who’s to blame? 
 
21 
Dutch Performance Agreements 
• An innovative approach (‘making a difference’: It 
pays to be different!), but still an experiment 
• More direction by ministry (but still: bottom-up) 
• A wake-up call 
– HEIs are committing themselves and are accountable for 
teaching quality 
• Political process 
– multiple stakeholders, multiple funding streams 
– compromises 
• Monitoring is required 
– “In God we trust. All others must bring data!” 
• Conflict: Institutional-level versus system-level goals 
• Danger: bureaucracy 
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Research questions on success of PA 
• An overload of pre-defined national objectives that are 
specified in detail in PA: 
– ignores the trade-offs between goals (dilemmas) 
– risk of returning to top-down steering 
– reduces institutional autonomy and frustrates dialogue 
– conflicts with other national monitoring efforts & agencies 
• The problem of assessing & measuring performance 
– risk of returning to input & activity measures 
– debates on what causes (under-)performance  
• The longer time horizons of PA 
– Risk of introducing rigidities in HEI 
• Less detailed PA work best 
– Use project funds (2nd/3rd stream funds) for specific, targeted 
goals 
